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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cheryl Biddle had not paid her medical bills.2  Nor had she consented to have her 
patient registration form released to anyone outside the hospital.3  What she did not 
know was that the hospital agreed to send all patient registration forms to a law 
firm.4  In turn, the firm attempted to collect any unpaid bills from the Social Security 
                                                                
1The author would like to thank Judge Markus, Desiree Kies, and Joel Rathbone for their 
thoughtful input and ideas concerning this Article.  She would also like to thank her immediate 
family and close friends for helping her through such a difficult time. 
2Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 520 (Ohio 1999). 
3Id. 
4Id. 
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Administration if they determined that the patient was eligible.5  The result: an 
unauthorized disclosure by the hospital of confidential medical information, induced 
by the law firm.6 
Victims of unauthorized disclosures of medical information have enjoyed strict 
protection by state and federal courts.  This is because secrecy is considered a sacred 
requirement in order to foster honesty and cooperation between a physician and 
patient.7  Confidentiality is considered such a vital ingredient to the physician-patient 
relationship by the medical profession that it is addressed in the oath, which is a 
prerequisite to admittance into the field of medicine: “All that may come to my 
knowledge in the exercise of my profession or outside of my profession or in daily 
commerce with men, which ought not to be spread abroad, I will keep secret and will 
never reveal.”8  The assurance of secrecy is, thus, ingrained in public policy and 
medical ethics and not in the “archaic whims of the common law.”9  The importance 
of this public policy and the confidentiality between physician and patient has 
increased the growing concern in Ohio and throughout the nation regarding the 
unauthorized release of medical information to third parties for approximately the 
last thirty years.10   
Recently, the state of Ohio has, once again, established itself as a leader in the 
development of the law concerning unauthorized disclosures of medical 
information.11  Ohio was first instrumental in developing this area of law when the 
                                                                
5Id.  At first, the hospital employees spent time determining which patients were eligible, 
which was authorized by the patient because the employees were agents of the hospital.  
Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 396.  However, eventually it was the law firm’s employees that 
determined which patients were eligible.  Id.  This practice was unauthorized.  Id.   
6Id. at 397.  “To establish liability the plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant knew or 
reasonably should have known of the existence of the physician-patient relationship, (2) the 
defendant intended to induce the physician to disclose information about the patient or the 
defendant reasonably should have anticipated that his actions would induce the physician to 
disclose such information, and (3) the defendant did not reasonably believe that the physician 
could disclose that information to the defendant without violating the duty of confidentiality 
that the physician owed the patient.”  Id. at 519.  
7Alan B. Vickery, Breach of Confidentiality: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426, 
1438-39 (1982). 
8Oath of Hippocrates, in DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 609 (26th ed. 
1981), cited in Vickery, supra note 7, at 1427 n.5.  See also A.M.A. Principles of Med. Ethics 
§ 9 (1957), reprinted in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1750-51 (W. Reich ed., 1978); MODEL 
CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4, EC 4-1, 4-4, 4-6, DR 4-401 (1980).  See also CODE 
OF MEDICAL ETHICS; Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 803 (N.D. Ohio 
1965) (“The confidences should be held as a trust and should never be revealed except when 
imperatively required by the laws of the state” in determining the disclosure was actionable.). 
9Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 793; Robert A. Wade, The Ohio Physician-Patient Privilege: 
Modified, Revised, and Defined, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 1147 (1989) (explaining that the privilege 
was not recognized initially by common law, and that state legislatures had to authorize the 
privilege via statutes). 
10Vickery, supra note 7, at 1428-29. 
11Biddle, 715 N.E.2d 518. 
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physician-patient privilege was initially recognized.12  Although courts have been 
cognizant of the breach of confidentiality tort, few courts throughout the United 
States have addressed the inducement aspect of the breach of patient confidentiality 
by a third party.13  But now, in the boldest move since Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty 
& Surety Co.,14 the inducement of an unauthorized disclosure of medical information 
has taken a new twist.  Ohio is the first state to hold that a law firm can be 
considered a third party and held liable for inducing a disclosure.15  In Biddle v. 
Warren General Hospital, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a law firm who is 
employed by the hospital is not considered an agent of the hospital and does not have 
the same duty of confidentiality to the patient because the law firm’s duty is to the 
hospital.16  Therefore, a law firm is a third party and can be held liable for inducing a 
physician or hospital to make an unauthorized disclosure of medical information.17 
Although some may argue that Biddle is the beginning of the end for the 
physician-patient privilege and attorney-client privilege, this is not the case.  This 
Article will explore various ways to avoid the situation encountered in Biddle while 
keeping the privilege intact.  The development of the breach of confidentiality tort, 
both throughout the nation and in Ohio, is examined in Part II.  In Part III, the 
closely related inducing a breach of confidentiality by a third party tort is analyzed 
nationally and in Ohio.  Part IV will provide an in-depth look at Biddle’s18 facts, 
reasoning, and failed arguments, as well as possible solutions for hospitals, 
physicians, and law firms who may encounter this situation today and in the future. 
                                                                
12See Wade, supra note 9, at 1148.  The first statute authorizing the privilege was created 
in 1828.  See N.Y. REV. STAT. 406 § 73 (1828).  Ohio’s statute is OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2317.02(B) (West 1999), and the first Ohio Supreme Court case treating an unauthorized 
disclosure was in 1928.  See Jones v. Stanko, 160 N.E. 456 (Ohio 1928). 
13Panko v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 423 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1970); Alberts v. Devine, 479 
N.E.2d 113 (Mass. 1985); Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc. 2d 148 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979); Moses v. 
McWilliams, 549 A.2d 950 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Alexander v. Knight, 177 A.2d 142 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1962); Morris v. Consolidated Coal, 446 S.E.2d 648 (W. Va. 1994); see also text 
accompanying footnotes 134-63 infra.  
14Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 793 (holding a third party liable for the inducement of 
unauthorized disclosure of medical information).   
15Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 522-23.  
16Id. at 525-26. 
17Id.  Because the issue was not addressed, it is still questionable as to whether the third 
party is also liable to the hospital for the breach as well as the patient, or if the hospital should 
be required to indemnify or contribute to the hospital’s portion of the liability.  Id.   
18Id. at 518. 
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II.  BREACH OF CONFIDENTIALITY TORT 
A.  National Development 
1.  Theories of Liability 
Although the physician-patient privilege has existed since 1828,19 courts did not 
thoroughly examine the unauthorized disclosure of medical information until the 
latter half of the twentieth century.  State courts have altered the treatment of 
unauthorized disclosures, through an evolution of various theories of liability, and 
sometimes used multiple theories of recovery in their analyses.20  Although the other 
theories of liability are still utilized, most states eventually recognized the breach of 
confidentiality as its own tort.21 
One of the first theories of liability for unauthorized disclosures to be widely 
used is invasion of privacy.22  Plaintiffs often brought actions for invasion of privacy 
when the focus of their case was more on the nature of the injury instead of the 
fiduciary relationship.23  Many courts moved further away from the invasion of 
privacy tort because the unauthorized disclosures were difficult to place into one 
specific legal category of privacy law.24  Also, determining who should be legally 
responsible for protecting a patient’s interests was also highly debated, because there 
is no limit as to who can be held liable for a disclosure.25  Unlike the tort of the 
                                                                
19N.Y. REV. STAT. 406 § 73 (1828).  See also Wade, supra note 9, at 1148. 
20See, e.g., Dubin v. Wakuzawa, 970 P.2d 496 (Haw. 1998) (containing allegations that the 
disclosure of plaintiff’s medical condition to a third party was based on breach of contract, 
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of patient-physician relationship, defamation, unfair and 
deceptive trade practices, and negligent/intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
21Some states still continue to deny patients the right to an action for breach of 
confidentiality.  However, they are in the minority.  See Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. 
Supp. 1328, 1335 (D.D.C. 1978) (applying D.C. law); Collins v. Howard, 156 F. Supp. 322, 
324 (S.D. Ga. 1957) (applying Georgia law); Quarles v. Sutherland, 389 S.W.2d 249 (Tenn. 
1965). 
22Privacy law is generally divided into four different areas.  According to Prosser, these 
are “intrusion upon seclusion,” “appropriation of name or likeness,” “publicity given to private 
life,” and “publicity placing a person in false light.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 
652B-652E (1977).  In the past, courts have typically used the third category to honor cases of 
the unauthorized release of medical information.  Vickery, supra note 7, at 1426. 
23See Horne v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824 (Ala. 1974) (disclosing medical information to 
patient’s employer); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d 284 (Idaho 1961) (giving 
banking information about depositor to employer); Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1977) (granting preliminary injunction against psychiatrist’s publication of patient 
confidences), cited collectively in Vickery, supra note 7, at 1438-39. 
24Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 696 P.2d 527, 530 (Or. 1985).  See also 
Berger v. Sonneland 1 P.3d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (holding, under Washington statute, a 
tort action exists; however, the court also concluded that the action was similar to an invasion 
of privacy, allowing the plaintiff to recover damages, including emotional damages, for the 
harm caused by defendant physician’s unauthorized disclosure). 
25Humphers, 696 P.2d at 530; Vickery, supra note 7, at 1439. 
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unauthorized disclosure of confidential information, no higher duty is needed in 
order to find liability for invasion of privacy.26  This difference is explained in 
Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, where a physician revealed the identity 
of the birth mother to a daughter who had been given up for adoption.27  The court 
held that the physician was liable for failing to keep a confidence under the breach of 
confidentiality.28  Despite the fact that the issue was a privacy interest, the physician 
was not liable because of an obligation under a general duty of people at large not to 
invade one another’s privacy by prying into personal facts.29  Other requirements 
limit a finding of invasion of privacy but do not limit the tort of unauthorized 
disclosures;30 specifically, the information that is disclosed must be released to the 
public at large and be “highly offensive,” whereas the tort of unauthorized 
disclosures can arise regardless of the degree of offensiveness.31  Thus, the invasion 
of privacy theory is less inclusive than the breach of confidentiality theory.32 
A second theory on which courts base liability for disclosures is breach of 
implied contract.  Courts who use the breach of implied contract theory focus more 
on the conduct of the parties involved instead of their relationship to each other.33 
MacDonald v. Clinger considered this focus in a case regarding a psychiatrist who 
disclosed “intimate details” about his patient to the patient’s wife.34  The New York 
court held that a breach of implied contract would be inadequate because only certain 
economic wrongs could be remedied using contract law.35  The court stated, “[i]f 
plaintiff’s recovery were limited to an action for breach of contract … he would 
generally be limited to economic loss flowing directly from the breach and would 
                                                                
26Humphers, 696 P.2d at 530.  See also Vickery, supra note 7, at 1439 (“The interests 
present in confidentiality cases are (1) the expectation of confidentiality arising from the 
assurance of secrecy and the reliance thereon; and (2) freedom from circulation of damaging 
information.  The first of the confidentiality interests is not protected at all by the privacy 
action, and the second interest is protected only partially because of the doctrinal limitations of 
the privacy action.”). 
27696 P.2d at 527. 
28Id. 
29Id. at 531. 
30
“Not every secret concerns personal or private information…[s]ecrecy involves 
intentional concealment…and secrecy hides far more than what is private.”  Id. at 529 
(criticizing the invasion of privacy right of action for a breach of confidence case). 
31RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977), cited in Vickery, supra note 7, at 
1438-41. 
32Various doctrines and requirements limit recovery under the invasion of privacy theory.  
Id. at 1442.  The Publicity requirement prevents liability unless the offensive disclosure is to 
the public at large.  Id.  The Legitimate Public Interest doctrine prevents recovery if the 
information disclosed has a legitimate public interest.  Id.  The Public Figure doctrine prevents 
recovery if aspects of the person’s life is open to publicity because they are a public figure.  Id. 
33Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W. 849 (Ky. 1912); Munzer v. Blaisdell, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944), cited collectively in Vickery, supra note 7, at 1438. 
3484 A.D.2d 482, 482 (N.Y. App. Div. 4 1982). 
35Id. at 486. 
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thus be precluded from recovering for mental distress, loss of his employment and 
the deterioration of his marriage.”36  The court was concerned with honoring physical 
and mental loss that cannot be recovered from a breach of contract.37  However, the 
court upheld an action for breach of confidentiality because a duty grew out of the 
patient’s trust and confidence in his psychiatrist and the tort was “easily separable 
from the mere breach of contract.”38  Therefore, the breach of implied contract theory 
is inadequate because it does not provide for emotional and physical damages that 
are common when unauthorized disclosures of medical information occur.39 
Although not frequently alleged, a court can base liability on intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.40  In order to sustain an action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, the conduct is required to be “so outrageous in 
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, 
                                                                
36Id.  The court called the action a “breach of fiduciary duty of confidentiality.”  Id. at 482.  
However, this is the equivalent to a breach of confidentiality because one of the requirements 
of a breach of confidentiality is that a relationship must exist that gives rise to a physician-
patient privilege.  Id. 
37MacDonald, 84 A.D.2d at 482. 
38Id.  The court also explored an exception where public interest requires disclosure to 
protect the threatened interest.  Although the exception did not exist in this case, the court did 
address that disclosure is permitted when there is danger to a patient, a spouse or another 
person.  Id. at 488; see also text accompanying footnote 60, infra, for further discussion of the 
public interest exception. 
39MacDonald, 84 A.D.2d at 486. 
40Andrews v. Bruk, 220 A.D.2d 376 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).  Attorneys have also alleged 
claims for disclosure based on negligent infliction of emotional distress; however, this theory 
of liability is inapplicable because this arises when the plaintiff is a spectator of a traumatic 
event caused by the defendant when a special relationship exists between the victim and the 
plaintiff.  Kniskern v. Somerford Twp., 678 N.E.2d 273 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Lanza-Costlow 
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 640 N.E.2d 583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Blackstone v. Lyden 
Co., No. 94CA005886, 1995 WL 324112 (Ohio Ct. App. May 31, 1995); Midwestern Indemn. 
Co. v. Craig, 665 N.E.2d 712 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Fosnight v. Esquivel, 666 N.E.2d 273 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Boso v. Erie Ins. Co./Erie Ins. Exchange, 669 N.E.2d 47 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1995); Baker v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 669 N.E.2d 553 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Erie Ins. Group 
v. Wolff, 640 N.E.2d 583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Burris v. Grange Mut. Cos., 545 N.E.2d 83 
(Ohio 1989), overruled on other grounds as recognized by Dickerson v. Thompson, 624 
N.E.2d 784 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).  Courts are also reluctant to recognize negligent infliction 
of emotional distress when only emotional distress damages existed.  See Gracey v. Eaker, 747 
So. 2d 475 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (failing to recognize a cause of action for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress without an accompanying physical injury).  But see Berger, 1 
P.3d 1187 (holding that a plaintiff seeking compensation for emotional damages resulting 
from such an action need not meet the heightened standards designed to limit liability in cases 
alleging bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress).  In addition, claims have been 
brought in the past for negligence solely; however, the courts usually treat negligence claims 
using more specific bases of liability such as negligent training and supervision.  See Doe v. 
Community Health Plan-Kaiser Corp., Nos. 7342-97, 01-97-052157, 1999 WL 624551 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Apr. 12, 1999) (stating that a weakness of the negligence theory is that claims based 
on an intentional act of disclosure are not covered under a negligence theory of liability). 
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and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”41  
The conduct of the disclosing party is often not considered ‘outrageous’ enough for 
the plaintiff to recover under this theory.42  This was the case in Andrews v. Bruk 
when a physician released medical records in his divorce proceedings detailing that 
his patient had undergone a vasectomy in order to show that the patient and the 
physician’s wife were having an affair.43  The court held that while the physician’s 
actions were not condoned, they were not at a level that constituted extreme and 
outrageous conduct.44  In contrast to the outrageous conduct required by intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, the breach of confidentiality tort only requires a 
disclosure, and outrageous or extreme conduct is not necessary.45 
An additional theory of liability recognized by some courts is defamation.  Courts 
have limited liability for defamation cases regarding unauthorized disclosures of 
medical information by requiring a specific injury in order to recover.  For example, 
in Bullion v. Gadaleto, a patient sued his psychologist for breach of confidence when 
he revealed his patient’s sexual indiscretions and other confidences to the patient’s 
wife.46  The court stated, “[d]efamation is chiefly concerned with injury to a person’s 
reputation, and that specific injury must occur before a cause of action arises.”47  The 
court ultimately held that the duty of confidentiality was more suitable because it 
protects every injury that results from a disclosure, instead of only specific injuries 
that are actionable under defamation.48 
Courts have also addressed whether an unauthorized disclosure can fall under the 
theory of medical malpractice.49  This reasoning is based on the argument that a 
disclosure by a medical professional can constitute medical malpractice.  In a case 
from an Arkansas court, a patient brought an action for medical malpractice after the 
patient’s nurse revealed to a third party that the patient either had AIDS or was being 
tested for it.50  The court denied liability because the disclosure did not fall under the 
                                                                
41Andrews, 220 A.D.2d at 376 (quoting Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 
N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment d.). 
42Id. 
43Id. 
44Id.  No action was brought for breach of confidentiality.  If brought, the plaintiff most 
likely would have won because the physician knew of the existence of the physician patient 
relationship and disclosed the information to the court despite the fact that the patient had not 
authorized the disclosure.  Id.   
45Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 523. 
46872 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Va. 1995). 
47Id. at 307.  The plaintiff was suing under the theory of defamation because the statute of 
limitations had passed for the breach of confidentiality tort.  Id. at 304.  If the statute of 
limitations had not passed, recovery most likely would have been permitted because the court 
recognized that emotional distress satisfies the damage element to a cause of action for breach 
of confidentiality.  Id. at 307. 
48Id. at 306. 
49See, e.g., Wyatt v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 868 S.W.2d 505 (Ark. 1994). 
50Id. at 505. 
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definition of a medical injury that was the result of a doctor’s treatment or order.51  In 
addition, the court did not find it necessary to award liability under medical 
malpractice, but instead found that disclosures should fall under the theory of 
negligence because an unauthorized disclosure can be analyzed using everyday 
experience and common knowledge of a lay person.52  The court held that only 
“[w]here the matter requires the consideration of the professional skill and 
knowledge of the practitioner of the medical facility, the more specialized theory of 
medical malpractice applies.”53  Thus, the definitions of medical injury and medical 
malpractice prevented an action under the theory of medical malpractice, and the tort 
of breach of confidentiality would better apply to the disclosures by a nurse. 
In addition, statutes in many states provide that a physician or hospital should not 
disclose confidential patient information.54  However, these statutes do not always 
clearly state that a patient has a resulting cause of action due to the disclosure.55  
Plaintiffs have often turned to other theories of liability because a plaintiff cannot 
receive compensation when no cause of action is stated in the statute.  Another 
concern is that many statutes only offer administrative disciplinary action as a 
reprimand to those who have disclosed information without authorization instead of 
a monetary form of compensation.56  The statutes that do provide compensation often 
require that the specific relationship stated in the statute must exist and the defendant 
must fall under the class specifically protected by the statute in order to receive 
compensation.57  Due to the restrictions specified in each statute, the statutory cause 
of action has often proved inadequate when compared to the breach of 
confidentiality tort which is more easily applied. 
The weaknesses present in the other theories of liability have increased the trend 
toward recognizing unauthorized disclosure of medical information as an 
independent tort in the past three decades.58  The elements of the breach of 
                                                                
51Id. at 509.  Here, the plaintiff was suing the hospital’s medical malpractice insurer, 
presumably because the insurer was another deep pocket.  Id. at 505. 
52Id. at 509. 
53Wyatt, 868 S.W.2d at 505 (citing Borrillo v. Beekman Downtown Hosp., 146 A.D.2d 
734 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)). 
54Vickery, supra note 7, at 1447.   
55Id.  But see Berger, 1 P.3d 1187 (holding that a tort action existed under WASH. REV. 
CODE § 7.70.030(1) for damages resulting from the unauthorized disclosure of confidential 
information related to health care and obtained within the physician-patient relationship). 
56ALASKA STAT. § 06.05.175(a), (c) (Michie 1981) (stating that failure of bank to maintain 
confidentiality of bank records subjects it to disciplinary action); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6509(9) 
(McKinney Supp. 1981-82) and Rules of the Board of Regents, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & 
REGS. tit. VIII, § 29.1(b)(8) (1979) (providing together that a physician’s professional 
misconduct includes breach of patient confidence), cited collectively in Vickery, supra note 7, 
at 1447. 
57Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 802-03; Peterson, 367 P.2d at 286-87 (holding no implied 
cause of action because no statute existed prohibiting bank disclosures); Doe, 93 Misc. 2d at 
215-16, cited collectively in Vickery, supra note 7, at 1447. 
58An additional theory of liability may be referred to as a breach of trust.  However, the 
courts that have treated this theory have done so in the same breath of their treatment with the 
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confidentiality are (1) the existence of a doctor-patient relationship, and (2) a 
disclosure of confidential information to a third party by a physician or medical 
entity that was gained from the patient during the privileged relationship.59  There is 
no prerequisite of a disclosure to the public at large or of specific types of damages 
in order to sustain a cause of action for the unauthorized disclosure of medical 
information to a third party.  The breach of confidentiality tort offers a concrete 
analysis applicable to a broad class of plaintiffs that courts have applied to various 
factual scenarios with ease. 
2.  Defenses 
However, defenses exist which restrict application of the breach of 
confidentiality and protect defendants from a barrage of claims.  A number of public 
policy exceptions limit liability for disclosures, despite being unauthorized by the 
patient.60  The common thread between all these limitations is that they are 
                                                          
breach of confidence or unauthorized disclosure and have not distinguished the two as being 
different theories.  Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 793. 
59Vickery, supra note 7, at 1442, 1455. 
60Various limitations include when danger to a patient, a patient’s spouse, or other person 
exists: MacDonald, 84 A.D.2d at 482 (holding disclosure was not permitted because no danger 
to a proximate individual was present); Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d 814 (Utah 1958) 
(permitting disclosure to patient’s fiance’s parents because a higher duty to give out 
information existed); when the physical condition of the patient is an element to the claim: 
Mull v. String, 448 So. 2d 952 (Ala. 1984) (permitting disclosure when patient’s health is at 
issue); Hague v. Williams, 181 A.2d 345 (N.J. 1962) (holding disclosure revealing a heart 
condition was permitted because the physical condition was an element of the claim); if the 
patient has a highly contagious or infectious disease: Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831 
(Neb. 1920) (holding disclosure to those at risk of a contagious or infectious disease is not a 
breach); in a general duty to warn case: Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 
(Cal. 1976) (stating therapist’s duty was to “take whatever other steps are reasonably 
necessary under the circumstances” to warn the potential victim and holding therapist liable 
for his failure to warn a female student or her family when his patient had revealed to the 
therapist that he was going to buy a gun and shoot the student); Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield 
Family Counseling Ctr., 673 N.E.2d 1311 (Ohio 1997) (ruling outpatient setting still 
constituted relationship that created a duty of the psychotherapist to protect against the 
patient’s violent tendencies); if the physician is testifying during a judicial proceeding: Smith 
v. Driscoll, 162 P. 572 (Wash. 1917) (ruling that when taking the stand in a court proceeding, 
a doctor will not be liable if the comments were relevant and the privilege is not abused); if the 
duty is not recognized within the jurisdiction: Evans v. Rite Aid Corp., 478 S.E.2d 846 (S.C. 
1996) (holding a pharmacist cannot be held liable to breach of confidentiality in South 
Carolina because the duty of confidentiality of a pharmacist is not recognized); in First 
Amendment and Public Right to Know situations: Vickery, supra note 7, at 1466 (noting 
example of whether a candidate is physically fit for office); see also Hill, Defamation and 
Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1291-99 (1976) (discussing 
confidentiality and the First Amendment); if the disclosure is required for a medical peer 
review process: Alar v. Mercy Mem’l Hosp., 529 N.W.2d 318 (Mich. App. 1995) (permitting 
disclosure during peer medical record review because the duty of confidentiality is owed to the 
patient by every doctor who is present at the review); when a medical malpractice claim is 
brought by the patient against the physician: Rea v. Pardo, 132 A.D.2d 442 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1987) (permitting disclosure if in reasonable anticipation of a malpractice claim being brought 
by the patient); Moses, 549 A.2d at 950 (holding that patient waived confidentiality by filing a 
malpractice claim); if a crime or fraud is disclosed: People v. Johnson, 125 Cal. Rptr. 725 
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developed from various public policies that courts feel supercede the importance of 
the confidentiality between a physician and patient.  Therefore, an exception exists if 
a court determines that a public policy concern, which permits or requires disclosure, 
is more important than the patient’s right to keep medical information confidential.61 
In addition to the various exceptions, other defenses are available for one who is 
accused of an unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical information.  One 
defense that can be asserted is the statute of limitations has run and the claim is time-
barred.62  The few courts that have treated this issue have reached varying results.63  
For example, in Bullion v. Gadaleto, a psychologist raised the statute of limitations 
defense after he revealed confidential information to his patient’s wife in an effort to 
destroy their marriage and initiate his own sexual relationship with the wife.64  The 
psychologist prevailed when he argued that the cause of action for breach of 
confidentiality accrued when the disclosure occurred and not when the patient 
himself was aware of the breach.65  Because the plaintiff had brought the claim under 
the personal injury case of action, the defense argued that the personal injury two-
year statute of limitations applied.66  The court determined that “[a]n action accrues 
when the essential elements of a cause of action are present.”67  As a result, a cause 
                                                          
(Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (stating that right of confidentiality is lost where depositor attempted to 
defraud bank); Hague v. Williams, 181 A.2d at 345 (N.J. 1962); State v. McCray, 551 P.2d 
1376 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (discussing bank’s privilege to disclose depositor’s bad checks to 
police on informal inquiry); see also Vickery, supra note 7, at 1464-65 (stating that special 
caution must be used when acting only on reasonable suspicion); if authorized by a court 
order: Hague, 181 A.2d at 345; Johnson, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 725 (loss of right of confidentiality 
where depositor attempted to defraud bank); McCray, 551 P.2d at 1376 (discussing bank’s 
privilege to disclose depositor’s bad checks to police on informal inquiry); see also Vickery, 
supra note 7, at 1464-65 (special caution must be used when acting only on reasonable 
suspicion); but see Brandt v. Med. Defense Assoc., 856 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1993) (holding that 
ex parte communications are actionable only if they exceed the bounds of the waiver of the 
privilege, but are otherwise permitted); Stempler v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1985) 
(holding that ex parte interviews are permitted if proper channels are utilized and bad faith is 
not used); but see Wade, supra note 9, at 1147 (stating a controversy exists as to whether the 
disclosure is permitted ex parte). 
61Vickery, supra note 7, at 1466-68. 
62Ohio’s discovery rule arises when the plaintiff should have discovered the responsible 
source of the disclosure or other action.  66 OH. JUR. 3D Limitations & Laches § 65 (1986).  
Other states may determine the accrual date in a different manner.  Id. 
63Bullion, 872 F. Supp. at 303; Tighe v. Ginsberg, 146 A.D.2d 268 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
64872 F. Supp. at 304-05. 
65Id. at 306. 
66Id.  Virginia’s personal injury statute of limitations period was two years.  VA. CODE 
ANN. § 8.01-243(A) (Michie 1992).  Even though the court assumed that the breach of 
confidentiality was a valid tort, because the cause of action accrued more than two years 
before the suit was brought, the action was time-barred.  Bullion, 872 F. Supp. at 306. 
67Id. at 305.  This is true even if the injury is very slight and becomes more substantial at a 
later date.  Id. at 306.  The court also notes that the more intimate or embarrassing the 
information is that is disclosed, the more damaging the disclosure and injury may be.  Id.  The 
intent is to “discourage[s] any injury that might result from a physician’s unauthorized 
disclosure of information.”  Id. (emphasis added).   
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of action for breach of confidentiality accrues when the first unauthorized disclosure 
outside of the physician-patient privilege occurs, subject to the applicable statute of 
limitations, and in Bullion, a two-year statute.68 
Another case that explored the statute of limitations defense took a slightly 
different approach.69  In Tighe v. Ginsberg, the patient was being examined for 
hearing loss that he suspected was caused by conditions at work and the examining 
physician sent a written report to the patient’s employer detailing his findings 
without authorization.70  The court determined the three-year statute of limitations, 
which pertained to general tort actions, was more appropriate than that of medical 
malpractice.71  Here, the court found that since (1) the breach of duty did not occur 
while “examining, diagnosing, treating, or caring” for the patient; and (2) no medical 
expert was required to evaluate the evidence in the breach of duty cases as required 
for medical malpractice, the action was a tort and should have a statute of limitations 
that was analogous to a general tort instead of medical malpractice.72  The three-year 
statute of limitations in Tighe is distinguishable from the two-year statute of 
limitations in Bullion because the former is based on an action for negligence, while 
the latter is based on an action for personal injury.73  Courts considering statute of 
limitations issues in the future will most likely determine what time period to apply 
by examining both the particular jurisdiction and the statutes of limitations from 
analogous causes of action. 
Another defense exists when the defendant receives explicit consent from the 
plaintiff.  However, the evidence must be absolutely clear that consent was obtained 
in order to protect a physician from liability.74  In Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s Brooks 
Brothers, the plaintiff brought suit against her plastic surgeon when he used ‘before’ 
and ‘after’ photographs of her cosmetic surgery at a presentation at a department 
store, as well as a television program that promoted his practice.75  The physician 
argued that he had obtained verbal consent to use her photographs in any lectures he 
might give or in any other way that might help the patients.76  The court held that 
only clear evidence of consent by the patient insulates a physician from liability.77  
Therefore, the safest way for a physician to avoid liability for confidentiality is to 
obtain written consent for disclosure for purposes that are absolutely clear.  In 
                                                                
68Bullion, 872 F. Supp. at 307. 
69Tighe, 146 A.D.2d at 268. 
70Id. at 269-70. 
71Id. at 272.  Similar to Bullion, the action in Tighe was also brought under an action for 
personal injury, but no specific statute of limitations existed for New York and they proceeded 
under the general tort statute of limitations instead.  Id.  
72Id. at 271-72. 
73Tighe, 146 A.D.2d at 270, 272; Bullion, 872 F. Supp. at 305. 
74Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1985). 
75Id. at 584. 
76Id. at 586.  The department store, Garfinckel’s, was not held liable because it was 
justified in its reliance on the physician’s assurances that the patient consented.  Id. at 590. 
77Id. 
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Biddle, the hospital’s authorization form did not include any language referring to a 
law firm and, consequently, the defense was not recognized.78 
B.  Development of Ohio Cases 
An understanding of the history of Ohio’s law concerning breach of 
confidentiality regarding medical information emphasizes the significance of the 
decision in Biddle v. Warren General Hospital.79  Ohio courts have assumed a 
leading role in strengthening patients’ rights regarding disclosures ever since breach 
of confidentiality was first considered actionable in Ohio.80  However, it was not 
until 1988 that the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged that a physician could be held 
liable for unauthorized disclosures of medical information.81  Still, it is the oft-cited 
1965 decision of the Northern District of Ohio, interpreting Ohio law in Hammonds 
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,82 that first fully examined the policy behind the 
breach of confidentiality tort.83 
                                                                
78Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 527.  Specifically, the authorization form in Biddle stated 
“[a]uthorization is hereby granted to release to my insurance company and/or third party 
payor such information including medical records as may be necessary for the completion of 
my hospitalization claims. . . .”  Id. (emphasis added).  The Ohio Supreme Court did not 
consider the law firm to be included in the language “third party payor.”  Id. 
79Id. at 518. 
80Jones, 160 N.E. at 456. 
81Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 529 N.E.2d 449 n.19 (Ohio 1988). 
82Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 793. Although not the first decision to recognize the breach 
of confidentiality tort, Hammonds has been cited by numerous other courts because of its 
exploration of the public policy behind the physician-patient relationship and its reasoning for 
holding the physician liable for breaches of confidentiality.  See United States v. Willis, 737 F. 
Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Nedd v. United Mine Workers, 556 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1977); 
Dickinson v. Magargal, No. 91-CV-4533, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13789 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 
1993); Manion v. N.P.W. Med. Ctr., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 585 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Howes v. United 
States, 887 F.2d 729 (6th Cir. 1989); Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 320 F. Supp. 335 
(W.D. Mich. 1970); Mikel v. Abrams, 541 F. Supp. 591 (W.D. Mo. 1982); Hoesl v. United 
States, 451 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Logan, 447 F. Supp. at 1328; McNerney v. Sec. of 
HHS, No. 90-1689V, 1992 U.S. Cl. Ct. LEXIS 228 (Cl. Ct. May 5, 1992); Romine v. 
Medicenters of America, Inc., 476 So. 2d 51 (Ala. 1985); Mull, 448 So. 2d at 952; Horne v. 
Patton, 287 So. 2d 824 (Ala. 1973); Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976); Duquette v. 
Superior Court, 778 P.2d 634 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Valencia v. Duval Corp., 645 P.2d 1262 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Heller v. Norcal Mut. Ins. Co., 876 P.2d 999 (Cal. 1994); Murphy v. 
Godwin, 303 A.2d 668 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973); Vassiliades, 492 A.2d at 580; Humana Med. 
Plan v. Jacobson, 614 So. 2d 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Coralluzzo v. Fass, 435 So. 2d 
262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Lee v. Corregedore, 925 P.2d 324 (Haw. 1996); Pearce v. 
Ollie, 826 P.2d 888 (Idaho 1992); Baylaender v. Method, 594 N.E.2d 1317 (Ill. Ct. App. 
1992); Petrillo v. Syntex Lab., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Kirk v. Financial Sec. 
Life Ins. Co., 369 N.E.2d 340 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Ahnert v. Wildman, 376 N.E.2d 1182 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1978); Geary v. Schroering, 979 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998); Leger v. Spurlock, 
589 So. 2d 40 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Green v. Otenasek, 296 A.2d 597 (Md. 1972); Stevens v. 
Barnhart, 412 A.2d 1292 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980); Sard v. Hardy, 367 A.2d 525 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1976), rev’d, 379 A.2d 1014 (Md. 1977); Hellman v. Board of Registration in 
Med., 537 N.E.2d 150 (Mass. 1989); Schwartz v. Goldstein, 508 N.E.2d 97 (Mass. 1987); 
Tower v. Hirschhorn, 492 N.E.2d 728 (Mass. 1986); Alberts, 479 N.E.2d at 113; Hannaway v. 
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In Hammonds, the court explained the intricacies of the physician-patient 
relationship in order to justify holding an insurance company liable for inducing a 
doctor’s intentional, unauthorized divulgence of confidences:84    
Since the layman is unfamiliar with the road to recovery, he cannot sift the 
circumstances of his life and habits to determine what is information 
pertinent to his health.  As a consequence, he must disclose all 
information in his consultations with his doctor—even that which is 
embarrassing, disgraceful or incriminating.  To promote full disclosure, 
the medical profession extends the promise of secrecy referred to above.  
The candor which this promise elicits is necessary to the effective pursuit 
of health; there can be no reticence, no reservation, no reluctance when 
patients discuss their problems with their doctors.  But the disclosure is 
certainly intended to be private.  If a doctor should reveal any of these 
confidences, he surely effects an invasion of the privacy of his patient.  
We are of the opinion that the preservation of the patient’s privacy is no 
mere ethical duty upon the part of the doctor; there is a legal duty as 
well.85 
                                                          
Cole, 311 N.E.2d 924 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974); Domako v. Rowe, 475 N.W.2d 30 (Mich. 1991); 
Jordan v. Sinai Hosp. of Detroit, Inc., 429 N.W.2d 891 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Wenninger v. 
Muesing, 240 N.W.2d 333 (Minn. 1976); Stubbs v. North Mem’l Med. Ctr., 448 N.W.2d 78 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Brandt v. Med. Defense Assocs., 856 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1993); State ex 
rel. Stufflebam v. Appelquist, 694 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Callahan v. Burton, 487 
P.2d 515 (Mont. 1971); Stempler v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1985); Runyon v. Smith, 730 
A.2d 881 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1999); Spaulding v. Hussain, 551 A.2d 1022 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. 1988); Aufrichtig v. Lowell, 650 N.E.2d 401 (N.Y. 1995); Madden v. Creative Servs., 646 
N.E.2d 780 (N.Y. 1995); Tighe, 146 A.D.2d at 268; Rea, 132 A.D.2d at 442; MacDonald, 84 
A.D.2d at 482; Anker, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 582; Doe, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 668; Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 
518; Littleton, 529 N.E.2d at 449; Orvets, 722 N.E.2d at 114; Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 
No. 96-T-5582, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1273 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1998); Wargo v. Buck, 
703 N.E.2d 811 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); Allinder v. Mount Carmel Health, No. 93 AP-156, 
1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 633 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 17, 1994); Honegger v. Saunders, No. 86 
AP-118 Ohio App. LEXIS 3736 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 13, 1988); Investors Reit One v. Jacobs, 
Nos. 86 AP 118, 86 AP 119, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 1252 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1988); 
Fletcher v. Bolz, 520 N.E.2d 22 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Levias v. United Airlines, 500 N.E.2d 
370 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985); Moore v. Grandview Hosp., No. CA 8808, 1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 
8571 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985); Conti v. Lynn, 75 AP-591, 1976 Ohio App. LEXIS 6329 (Ohio 
Ct. App. May 20, 1976); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 226 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1967); Lambdin v. Leopard, 251 N.E.2d 165 (Ohio Com. Pleas 1968); Bryson v. Tillinghast, 
749 P.2d 110 (Okla. 1988); Humphers, 696 P.2d at 527; Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 
684 P.2d 581 (Or. App. 1984); Moses, 549 A.2d at 950; McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 
431 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997); Schaffer v. Spicer, 215 N.W.2d 134 (S.D. 1974); Morris, 446 
S.E.2d at 648; Finn v. Schammel, 412 N.W.2d 147 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987); Chase v. People’s 
Drug Store, 24 V.I. 183 (1989). 
83The facts of Hammonds only included a claim for inducing disclosure instead of the 
breach itself.  243 F. Supp. at 793.  However, the court discusses the disclosure action at great 
length and it often cited for its exploration of the physician’s breach of the patient’s 
confidentiality and the liability that arises from that action.  Id. at 795-802. 
84Id. at 801. 
85Id. 
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The court further explained that it was the complimentary efforts of both “men of 
medicine,” who encouraged complete honesty from their patients, and “men of law,” 
who reinforced this encouragement by reassuring patients, that helped to create an 
atmosphere of complete disclosure.86  These professionals fostered patient autonomy 
by impressing on the patients that they themselves are the only individuals who can 
waive their privilege.87   
In Hammonds, the patient had brought an action against an insurance company 
for inducing disclosure from a physician by informing him that his patient was 
contemplating a malpractice suit against him.88  The court recognized the breach of 
confidentiality tort and found that modern public policy and medical ethics requires 
courts to enforce a physician’s implied assurance of secrecy.89  Despite the fact that 
the court recognized that some exceptions permitting disclosure exist, the court felt 
compelled to hold that any unauthorized disclosure of confidential information is 
tortious conduct and effectively gives rise to an action for damages.90 
An appellate court further expanded the claim for unauthorized disclosures of 
medical information by holding a medical examiner liable for a disclosure under the 
invasion of privacy theory, even when the traditional physician-patient relationship 
did not exist.91  In Levias v. United Airlines, recovery was permitted from a doctor 
who disclosed a flight attendant’s medical information to her supervisor as well as 
her husband.92  Because the physician was a medical examiner for her employer and 
not the patient’s personal physician, the typical physician-patient relationship was 
not present.93  The court predicated recovery on whether the party receiving the 
disclosure had a “real need to know, not mere curiosity” and whether the party had 
authority to act on the disclosed information.94  The court suggested several factors 
to consider in determining an invasion of privacy claim, including whether the party 
                                                                
86Id. at 797. 
87Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 797. 
88Id. at 795. 
89Id. at 796-97.  The court dismissed the defendants’ second argument that because no 
malicious motive existed, liability could not be enforced.  Id. at 798.  The court ignored 
persuasive authority (McPheeters v. Board of Med. Exam’rs, 284 P. 938 (Cal. 1930)), which 
held that a malicious purpose was required to state a cause of action, and instead held that only 
a purposeful divulgence of confidential information was needed to state a cause of action for 
the unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 798.  
90Id. at 802. 
91Levias, 500 N.E.2d at 370, 373.  The court rejected an action for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress because it would require proving a serious and debilitating injury existed, 
whereas proving invasion of privacy did not.  Id. at 370, 374.  Most actions for disclosure 
were based on these bases of liability at this time.  Id.  
92Id. at 370.  The physician-patient relationship was favored over the marital relationship 
because the husband also required a valid need to know the information in order to be the 
recipient of privileged, unauthorized medical information.  Id. at 370, 374. 
93Levias, 500 N.E.2d at 373.  The patient was seeking a waiver of weight limits that were 
imposed for appearance regulation that was applicable to being a flight attendant.  Id.   
94Id. at 374. 
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had any authority to act upon the data, whether the person’s own well being was at 
issue, or whether emergency care was required and whether the physician has a 
compelling reason to avoid seeking the patient’s permission before disclosing 
information.95  Because the physician was held liable even though he was not the 
patient’s regular doctor, Ohio law now recognizes liability that does not fall under 
the category of the traditional physician-patient relationship.96 
Another appellate court broadened the right to privacy action by honoring an 
action for an unauthorized disclosure that was the result of a negligent act instead of 
an intentional act.97  In Prince v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital, doctors sent a bill 
with the patient’s diagnosis of Alcoholism to a stranger at her husband’s place of 
employment.98  The court held, “[i]t seems to us that a negligent invasion of the right 
of privacy… can just as effectively invade one’s right of privacy as an intention to do 
so.”99  This ruling further strengthened patients’ rights to recover for unauthorized 
disclosures by allowing recovery for an action under any mental state.100 
Liability for unauthorized disclosures was, once again, extended when a court 
permitted recovery to a minor patient for a disclosure by a physician’s agent.101  In 
Hobbs v. Lopez, a nurse disclosed the minor’s pregnancy to her parents after she had 
sought advice for an abortion.102  The court enforced liability of the doctors and the 
corporation under the theory that the nurse was an agent; because the privilege has 
the same purpose for an agent of a physician, the agent is bound by the same 
obligation as the physician to keep the medical information in confidence.103  Also, 
the court refused to distinguish the fact that it was the parents of the minor who 
received the disclosure, implying that even parents are not privileged to receive 
medical information if it is unauthorized and that the parents are not able to authorize 
consent for their own child.104 
                                                                
95Id. at 375. 
96Id. at 374 (stating the examination of the patient was involuntary because she did not go 
to the physician attempting to seek medical care, but instead attended the examination in order 
to obtain a waiver for her employment). 
97Prince v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 484 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985). 
98Id. at 266. 
99Id. at 268.  Although the physicians were held liable, the hospital was not because the 
physicians were not employees of the hospital.  Id. at 267.   
100Id. 
101Hobbs v. Lopez, 645 N.E.2d 1261 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).  The court based liability on 
both breach of confidentiality and intentional infliction of emotional distress theories.  Id.  
However, the court would not enforce actions for invasion of privacy because the information 
was not disseminated to the public at large.  Id.  Also, the court held the violation amounted to 
conduct which held the defendants liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress and, 
therefore, did not predicate liability on negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Id. 
102Id. at 1262. 
103Hobbs, 645 N.E.2d at 1263. 
104Id. 
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Another protection offered for patients is the preclusion of obtaining only oral 
authorization from the patient or other doctors instead of written permission by the 
patient alone to release medical information.105  In Nationwide v. Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Jackson, an insured party gave authorization to an insurance company to 
obtain copies of all medical records, but had refused to authorize interviews of 
medical professionals and employers.106  The court held that, although a patient may 
waive the privilege of confidentiality, the consent must be in express terms.107  
Therefore, in order to properly guard patients’ privacy interests, each waiver 
obtained must be explicit and unambiguous in its terms.  
The Ohio Supreme Court also broadened patients’ rights by holding that the 
judiciary is not permitted to create any public policy exceptions to allow disclosures, 
but that the exceptions must be determined by the legislature instead.108  In State v. 
Smorgala, a patient was charged with driving under the influence when the results of 
her blood-alcohol test were released to a police officer after a car accident.109  The 
court upheld a reversal of her conviction because the physician-patient privilege was 
not subject to limitation by a judicially created public policy preference.110  The court 
held, “[j]udicial policy preferences may not be used to override valid legislative 
enactments, for the General Assembly should be the final arbiter of public policy.”111  
Consequently, only the legislature can determine which unauthorized disclosures are 
not actionable because a statutory exception precludes liability.112 
In addition, the Ohio Supreme Court expanded liability by not only requiring a 
medical professional to refrain from disclosing information, but by requiring an 
actual affirmative duty to disclose when there is a potential of harm by the patient.113  
Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Center, the Ohio companion case 
                                                                
105Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 226 N.E.2d at 760. 
106Id. at 761.  This is similar to Vassiliades, 492 A.2d at 580, where a physician was held 
liable for only obtaining oral consent to use before and after photographs of his patient’s 
cosmetic surgery at a presentation in a department store.  See text accompanying footnotes 74-
77 supra. 
107Id. at 762.  The court stated, “[f]urthermore, even if there is some ambiguity due to the 
fact that the contract says only ‘reports’ rather than ‘written reports,’ in general legal usage it 
is accepted that medical reports means written medical reports.”  Id. at 763.   
108State v. Smorgala, 553 N.E.2d 672 (Ohio 1990). 
109Id. at syllabus. 
110Id. at 674. 
111Id. 
112Id. 
113Estates of Morgan, 673 N.E.2d at 1311.  The development of the exceptions to 
disclosure liability in Ohio originated in the first case treating the duty of confidentiality by 
the Ohio Supreme Court.  Jones, 160 N.E. at 456.  In Jones, a widow brought a negligence suit 
against a doctor who failed to notify the health authorities and others in dangerous proximity 
to the patient as required by statute, that he was treating his patient with the extremely 
contagious disease, black smallpox.  Id. at 457.  The court concluded that if a statute requires 
disclosure, the duty of confidentiality is waived and the physician has an affirmative duty to 
disclose the medical information.  Id. at 456. 
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to the Tarasoff114 case, involved a vocational counselor who was held liable for his 
failure to prevent harm from occurring when a patient with a medical history of 
schizophrenia fatally shot each member of his family.115  The court discussed the 
statute providing that “no person shall be liable for any harm that results to any other 
person as a result of failing to disclose any confidential information about the mental 
health client or patient.”116  The court stated that despite the existence of the statute, a 
special relationship exists between a psychotherapist and a patient that creates a duty 
of the therapist to take affirmative steps to prevent any harm by the patient from 
occurring.117  The affirmative duty may make physician liability appear to have no 
boundaries in Ohio law, but many courts have found circumstances that limit legal 
responsibility. 
Although patients’ rights to recover for unauthorized disclosures have grown 
stronger, some restrictions are still valid and may be used as defenses by the 
disclosing party.  One appellate court held that the dangerous risk of a contagious 
disease may permit unauthorized disclosures of confidential medical information.118  
In Knecht v. Vandalia Medical Center Inc., a secretary of a medical center disclosed 
to her son that one of the patients had been treated for a venereal disease when she 
suspected her son had engaged in sexual relations with the patient.119  The court took 
into consideration that the employee did not “chat at will,” but only revealed the 
information out of fear of her son being exposed to a contagious disease.120  The 
court held that this was a qualified or conditional privilege because “a commonality 
of interest exists between the publisher and the recipient and the communication is of 
a kind reasonably calculated to protect that interest.”121  If the defense can prove 
against a high scrutiny that a common interest existed and that the disclosure did not 
stretch beyond the interest, then the defendant might not be held liable. 
Additionally, a physician’s ability to reveal confidential medical information 
pursuant to a court order or statute has long been enforced.122  In State v. Antill, the 
physician was required by statute to report an assault to law-enforcement officers 
and to testify in court about the resulting wounds.123  The physician was not held 
liable because the husband had used a deadly weapon and the statute required the 
                                                                
114Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 334. 
115Estates of Morgan, 673 N.E.2d at 1311. 
116OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.34 (West 1999). 
117Estates of Morgan, 673 N.E.2d at 1327. 
118Knecht v. Vandalia Med. Ctr., Inc., 470 N.E.2d 230 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).  See also 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.243 (West 1999). 
119Knecht, 470 N.E.2d at 231 (holding a patient may only be able to sue under the theory 
of invasion of privacy because an employee of a physician has no legal duty to refrain from 
divulging confidential medical information concerning the patient of that physician). 
120Id. at 232. 
121Id.  The court reasoned that the commonality of interest between a mother and a son is 
obvious and her disclosure to her son was not actionable.  Id.  
122State v. Antill, 197 N.E.2d 548 (Ohio 1964). 
123Id. at 552. 
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physician to disclose the perpetrator of an assault when a deadly weapon is used.124  
The Ohio Supreme Court reasoned, “[t]he publicity against which the privilege is 
supposed to protect has already taken place…. The only purpose that sustaining the 
privilege can now serve is to obstruct the course of justice.”125  If a statute or court 
order not only permits, but also requires disclosure, the defendant will not be held 
liable for the release of unauthorized confidential medical information.126   
Ohio statutory law may also limit a defendant’s liability by permitting a 
physician to reveal the results of a positive drug test, especially if the disclosure is to 
another physician.127  In Neal v. Corning Glass Works Corp., an employee had 
injured himself on the job and was taken to the emergency room for treatment where 
blood and urine samples were taken and subsequently yielded a positive drug test, 
which was then revealed to the physician hired by the employer.128  The court held 
that the disclosure to another physician was not actionable because the second 
physician owed the same fiduciary duty to the patient.129  Consequently, disclosures 
between physicians are permitted and encouraged when they concern a public policy 
and a common interest.130 
The law regarding unauthorized disclosures has become more strict for medical 
professionals since its inception.  The holding in Biddle v. Warren General Hospital 
that a hospital is liable for the release of patient registration forms to a law firm in an 
attempt to collect medical bills is representative of the courts’ unwillingness to 
permit an unauthorized disclosure to occur without legal responsibility.131  However, 
                                                                
124Id. 
125Id.  In addition, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 requires disclosure when the 
circumstances in the statute are satisfied.  Antill, 197 N.E.2d at 551.  In fact, the physician 
would incur liability if s/he did not disclose the medical information.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2921.22 (West 1999); Antill, 197 N.E.2d at 551. 
126Other statutes authorizing disclosure include OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (West 
1999) (determining when a physician may testify about privileged matters in court); 
§ 3701.243 (regarding disclosure of information about HIV tests); § 5122.31 (determining 
rights of patients who are hospitalized due to mental illness); § 2151.421 (statute requiring 
practitioners of medicine to report knowledge or suspicion of child abuse or neglect). 
127Neal v. Corning Glass Works Corp., 745 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D. Ohio 1989). 
128Id. at 1295. 
129Id. at 1297.  In addition, the disclosure to the company doctor and the disclosure by the 
employer’s doctor to the employer were also permitted under Knecht’s qualified privilege 
because a positive drug test affects both of the physicians’ mutual interests.  Id.; see Knecht, 
470 N.E.2d at 230 (holding that a qualified or conditional privilege exists when a commonality 
of interest exists between the publisher and recipient, and the communication reasonably 
protects that interest); see also text accompanying footnotes 117-28 supra.  The court stated in 
dicta that the drug usage by the patient could constitute a disclosure necessary to protect the 
welfare of the employees in the work environment.  Neal, 745 F. Supp. at 1297.  Therefore, a 
sufficient public policy probably would have permitted the disclosure.  Id.  
130Id.  Additionally, the court did not address the fact that the employer’s physician may 
have had a conflicting duty toward the employer which may not give him the same fiduciary 
duty toward the patient as the treating physician had.  Id.  
131Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 518. 
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in Biddle, it was not only the hospital, but also the law firm that was liable.132  The 
law firm was held responsible for the inducement of the hospital’s breach of 
confidentiality because the firm constituted a third party and was not considered an 
agent of the hospital. 133  Biddle is the most extreme example to date of liability for 
an unauthorized disclosure and the inducement of the disclosure. 
III.  THIRD PARTY INDUCEMENT OF THE BREACH OF CONFIDENTIALITY  
The inducement of an unauthorized disclosure is a subset of the breach of 
confidentiality tort.  Although inducing a physician to breach the duty of 
confidentiality is not an area that has been thoroughly explored, it is recognized that 
“a person who knowingly assists a fiduciary in committing a breach of trust is 
himself guilty of tortious conduct and is subject to liability for the harm thereby 
caused.”134  It is well settled that the elements which must be satisfied in order to 
establish liability for the inducement of an unauthorized disclosure are (1) the 
defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the existence of the physician-
patient relationship; (2) the defendant intended to induce the physician to disclose 
information about the patient or the defendant reasonably should have anticipated 
that his actions would induce the physician to disclose such information; and (3) the 
defendant did not reasonably believe that the physician could disclose that 
information to the defendant without violating the duty of confidentiality that the 
physician owed the patient.135  Since its birth in 1965, only a handful of cases have 
addressed the tort of the inducement of unauthorized disclosures.136 
A.  Development of Ohio Law 
It was an Ohio court that first held a third party liable for inducing a breach of 
confidentiality.137  In Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., an insurance 
company induced a physician to reveal confidential medical information when a 
                                                                
132Id. 
133Id. 
134RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1977) (Violation of a Fiduciary Duty).  See 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979) (Persons Acting in Concert).  Other 
types of fiduciary relationships that have been examined and treated similarly include 
attorney/client, accountant/client, banker/customer, trustee/beneficiary, principal/agent, 
director/corporation, law officer/informant, journalist/confidential source, parent/child, 
broker/client, clergy/penitent, employer/employee, telecommunications assistant/hearing 
impaired person, mediator/mediation participant, social worker/client, school guidance 
counselor/student, and husband/wife.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 874, 876 (1977). 
135Morris, 446 S.E.2d at 648.  Damages resulting from the breach itself and the inducing 
of the breach may be measured differently because the fiduciary would also be liable for the 
harm caused or profits made by the fiduciary.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1977) 
(Violation of a Fiduciary Duty). 
136Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 793.  See also Panko, 423 F.2d at 41; Neal, 745 F. Supp. at 
1294; Alberts, 479 N.E.2d at 113; Anker, 98 Misc. 2d at 148; Moses, 549 A.2d at 950; 
Alexander, 177 A.2d at 142; Curtis v. Fairfax Hosp., No. 129754, 129755, 1994 WL 1031299 
(Va. Cir. Ct. May 15, 1994); Morris, 446 S.E.2d at 648. 
137Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 793. 
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patient merely threatened to file a malpractice claim.138  When holding the insurance 
company liable, the court analogized the policy behind other laws regarding third 
party participation in breaches of trust to also apply to those who participate in or 
induce the breach of a fiduciary duty.139  Specifically, the court held that parties who 
are directly liable to a plaintiff are “third part[ies] who induce[] a breach of a 
trustee’s duty of loyalty, or participate[] in such a breach, or knowingly accept[] any 
benefit from such a breach….”140  The injustice invoked by inducing a breach of trust 
explained in Hammonds became the basis underlying future court decisions when 
holding parties liable for inducing an unauthorized disclosure. 
Another Ohio district court further expanded the tort of the inducement of a 
breach of confidentiality by holding an employer liable for inducing the disclosure of 
medical information regarding its employee.141  In Neal v. Corning Glass Works 
Corp., a patient brought an action against his employer for inducing his physician to 
release the positive results of a drug test in breach of the physician’s duty of 
confidentiality.142  The court held that an action for inducing the disclosure of 
confidential medical information exists, but recognized that a question of fact 
remained as to the employer’s role in ordering the drug test.143  The court 
distinguished a disclosure between two doctors, wherein the fiduciary duty of 
confidentiality is still owed to the patient by both physicians, from a disclosure 
between an employer and doctor, wherein the fiduciary duty of the employer owed to 
the employee is nonexistent.144  The Ohio courts’ bold step, by first holding a third 
party liable for inducing an unauthorized disclosure, provided a stringent application 
of patients’ highly protected rights of privacy. 
                                                                
138Id. at 800. 
139Id. at 803.  See also In re Van Sweringen Co., 119 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1941) (stating that 
one who knowingly joins a fiduciary in purchasing for profit the property of the trust estate in 
unlawful circumstances becomes jointly and severally liable with him for resultant profits); 
Shuster v. North American Mortg. Loan Co., 40 N.E.2d 130 (Ohio 1942) (holding that a third 
person, who, although not a transferee of trust property, has notice that the trustee is 
committing a breach of trust and participates therein, is liable for any loss caused by the 
breach of trust); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 326 (2d ed. 1959); Scott, Participation 
in Breach of Trust, 38 TRUST BULL. 41 (1958). 
140Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 803. 
141Neal, 745 F. Supp. at 1298. 
142Id. 
143Id. at 1298-99.  The action for inducing a breach was not dismissed along with the 
original breach of confidentiality action.  Id. at 1299.  Instead, the action for inducing the 
breach remained at bar because the court reasoned that the claim for inducing a breach of 
confidentiality was legally permitted.  Id. 
144Neal, 745 F. Supp. at 1299.  This reasoning seems illogical that one can be held liable 
for inducing a disclosure that wasn’t a violation of any relationship or duty.  However, the 
court held that the employer’s actions of inducing the disclosure of confidential medical 
information might have violated the patient’s right to privacy.  Id.  Consequently, the 
employer’s Motion for Summary Judgment was denied.  Id. 
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B.  Development of National Cases 
Other state courts have eventually followed Ohio’s example by recognizing the 
inducement of an unauthorized disclosure as an independent tort and contributing to 
the development of the law.  In Alberts v. Devine, a minister’s superiors induced a 
psychiatrist to disclose confidences during the minister’s evaluation for re-
appointment.145  The Massachusetts court broadened the application of inducement 
liability by analogizing its holding with the general rule that a party is liable for 
intentionally inducing another to commit any tortious acts.146  To avoid liability, the 
court held that the superiors must prove they reasonably believed the psychiatrist 
could disclose information without violating his duty of confidentiality.147  In order 
for an inducement to be actionable, “[t]he inducement need not be a threat, nor a 
promise of reward, but ‘may be a simple request or persuasion exerting only moral 
pressure.’”148  With the exception of the Ohio courts’ interpretations, Alberts is one 
of the few detailed expansions of the inducement tort. 
Some state courts recognized that the tort of inducement of unauthorized medical 
disclosures exists and should be punished, but could not hold a third party liable 
because of another issue.  In Alexander v. Knight, the defense’s doctor paid the 
personal injury plaintiff’s doctor fifty dollars to provide a report of the plaintiff’s 
condition without authorization.149  Although they did not consider the inducing of 
the breach to be significant, the court held both the plaintiff’s doctor and the 
defense’s doctor owed a duty to “refuse affirmative assistance to the patient’s 
antagonist in litigation” and should be condemned.150  In addition, an insurance 
investigator interviewed a physician without the express consent of the patient or a 
court order in Anker v. Brodnitz.151  In an effort to reduce the improper pressures on 
physicians to disclose unauthorized information, the court held liable any 
participants in the private interviews of a physician during the investigation of an 
insurance claim, for the disclosure or the inducement of the disclosure.152  In order to 
                                                                
145479 N.E.2d at 116. 
146Cobb v. Indian Springs, Inc., 522 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Ark. 1975) (negligence); 
Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 481-89 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (burglary and murder); Smith v. 
Thompson, 655 P.2d 116 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982) (arson); Nelson v. Nason, 177 N.E.2d 887 
(Mass. 1961) (negligence); Duke v. Feldman, 226 A.2d 345 (Md. 1966) (assault and battery); 
Rael v. Cadena, 604 P.2d 822 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (battery); Russell v. Marlboro Books, 183 
N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959) (libel), cited collectively in Alberts, 479 N.E.2d at 121. 
147Alberts, 479 N.E.2d at 122. 
148Id. at 121 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766, cmt. k (1979)).  The court 
reiterated the elements stated above that are required in order to hold a party liable for 
inducing a breach of confidentiality by a psychiatrist.  Id. 
149177 A.2d at 146. 
150Id.  
15198 Misc. 2d 148. 
152Id. at 153.  In order to deter such private interviews, both the physician and the 
insurance company would be held liable for disclosures that occurred during the private 
meeting.  Id.  The court’s reasoning was that “the adequacy of formal discovery procedures, 
the difficulty of determining what medical information is relevant, and the possibility of 
210 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 15:189 
protect the patient’s right to keep his or her medical information confidential, some 
New York courts require a ban on any private interviews of a physician while 
investigating a claim.153  Also, in Morris v. Consolidated Coal Co., a patient on 
worker’s compensation brought an action against his employer for inducing his 
physician to disclose that the patient was lying about the extent of his injury.154  The 
court held that “the concept of holding someone who induces a fiduciary to breach 
his fiduciary relationship is not a foreign concept.”155  Each court’s recognition of the 
tort of inducement of breach of confidentiality is yet another example of the high 
standard placed on enforcement of patients’ rights. 
However, various courts provided limitations to the independent tort of inducing 
a breach of confidentiality.  In Panko v. Consolidated Mutual Insurance Co., a 
store’s liability insurance investigators induced a physician to disclose a patient’s 
medical history and injuries without her consent when she brought a slip and fall 
action against a store.156  Despite the fact that the pre-trial disclosures were 
actionable, the customer ultimately failed because she could not prove the 
disclosures resulted in the loss of the personal injury action.157  The court held that 
the “[p]laintiff must show a causal connection between the allegedly tortious conduct 
and the injury complained of, even if the plaintiff succeeds in establishing an 
intentional unprivileged interference.”158  The causal connection requirement 
provided a limitation to disclosures that would otherwise be actionable. 
Another limitation for the inducement tort is that the action for the original 
breach of confidentiality must be successful in order for a third party to incur 
liability for the inducement of the breach.  In Moses v. McWilliams, a patient’s 
doctor had disclosed confidential medical information about his patient to his 
defense attorneys after the patient brought a medical malpractice action against him 
for negligent care.159  The court ruled that because the patient had voluntarily 
instituted a malpractice action against the doctor, the filing constituted a waiver of 
                                                          
doctors or insurers becoming the object of lawsuits for unauthorized disclosure require that 
there be no private interviews without a patient’s express consent.”  Id. at 154.  
153Id. at 153.  The court hoped that the rule would reduce unnecessary lawsuits for 
wrongful disclosure.  Anker, 98 Misc. 2d at 153. 
154446 S.E.2d 648, 650 (W. Va. 1944).  Case was brought by certified questions and the 
facts were not properly developed in the lower courts.  Id. at 657-58.   
155Id. at 657.  In addition to recognizing the elements for inducing a breach of 
confidentiality stated above, the court added a fourth element that “the physician wrongfully 
divulge[d] confidential information to the third party,” explicitly stating the holding in Moses, 
549 A.2d at 950.  Morris, 446 S.E.2d at 657. 
156423 F.2d at 42-43.  The way that the insurers induced the physician to disclose the 
information was by writing the physician and requesting that he fill out a medical report.  Id. 
at 42.  The physician completed the form without obtaining authorization from the patient.  Id.  
The doctor was ultimately paid to testify as an expert witness against her.  Id. at 42-43. 
157Id. at 44. 
158Panko, 423 F.2d at 44 n.4 (stating this is also true if the plaintiff’s cause of action is 
viewed as one for inducing breach of a contract with an implied term of secrecy). 
159549 A.2d at 952.  This claim was also brought against the medical center, but the 
analysis is the same for both parties.  Id.   
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the patient’s privilege.160  The court then determined that because the original breach 
of confidentiality was not actionable, all claims for inducing the physician to disclose 
must also fail.161  These limitations help to provide some defendant protection against 
unreasonable claims.162  But courts, on the whole, continue to remain overly cautious 
of patients’ rights when third parties induce unauthorized disclosures of confidential 
medical information. 
Courts throughout Ohio have upheld the right of a patient to sue a third party for 
inducing the unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical information by a 
physician.  However, it was the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in Biddle v. Warren 
General Hospital authorizing an action for inducement of confidential medical 
information by a third party that further advanced this claim.163 
IV.  BIDDLE v. WARREN GENERAL HOSPITAL164 
The willingness of courts to protect patients’ rights to confidentiality is best 
exemplified by the Ohio Supreme Court’s authorization of an independent tort for 
the inducement of an unauthorized disclosure of medical information.165   
A.  Facts 
The law firm of Elliott, Heller, Maas, Moro & Magill Co., L.P.A. [hereinafter 
“Elliott Heller”] approached Warren General Hospital [hereinafter “Warren 
Hospital”] with the proposition that Elliott Heller could attempt to collect unpaid 
medical bills through the assistance of the Social Security Administration.166  The 
parties subsequently entered into an unwritten agreement whereby Warren Hospital 
sent Elliott Heller patient registration forms to determine if the patients were eligible 
for Supplemental Security Income.167  Elliott Heller then called the eligible patients 
and if they consented, Elliott Heller assisted the patient by filing the claim with the 
                                                                
160Id. at 953. The court stated an additional public policy to that stated in Anker, 98 Misc. 
2d 148.  Moses, 549 A.2d at 955.  The court held, “[i]t is in the best interest that malpractice 
claims be investigated at the earliest possible stage to determine their validity.”  Id. (quoting 
Forster v. Manchester, 410 Pa. 192, 197 (1963)).  The court also based its ruling on the 
Pennsylvania physician-patient privilege which permits disclosure in civil matters brought by 
the patient for personal injury.  Id. 
161Id. at 960. 
162Another example of a limitation concerns a case for tortious interference with contract.  
Curtis, 1994 WL 1031299, at *1.  In Curtis, an employee of the defendant Fairfax Hospital 
brought an action for wrongful death of her infant.  Id.  However, the court found that there 
was no valid contractual relationship and a breach could not occur if no relationship existed 
that provided a fiduciary duty.  Id., at *2.  Therefore, a breach could not be induced when the 
relationship was not a valid one.  Id.   
163Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 518. 
164Id. 
165Id. 
166Id. at 520. 
167Id.  
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Social Security Administration.168  Under this agreement, Warren Hospital received 
payments for medical services that otherwise would be written off, and Elliott Heller 
was paid on a contingent basis for their efforts.169  The understanding between Elliott 
Heller and Warren Hospital was that the hospital was the initial client of the law 
firm, but the firm may “at some point in time” represent the patients individually 
concerning Social Security benefits.170  The registration forms released by the 
hospital included names, telephone numbers, ages, and medical conditions of each 
patient.171   
Initially, Warren Hospital had its own pre-screening process before sending files 
to Elliott Heller.172  Shortly after the process began, Warren Hospital abandoned its 
pre-screening process and released all its registration forms without obtaining 
authorization.173  The registration forms174 traveled weekly via courier, and were 
reviewed by attorney Robert Heller and his legal assistant, Sharyn Jacisin.175  If 
patients were eligible for Supplemental Security Income, they received a phone call 
from Jacisin or Heller’s secretary, Melanie Sutton.176  Jacisin and Sutton stated that 
they were calling on behalf of the hospital, and informed the patients that they may 
be eligible for help paying their medical bills.177  If patients expressed interest, they 
were referred to Heller to receive further assistance.178  Heller claimed that he did not 
tell the patients that Elliott Heller would be representing them.179  However, one 
                                                                
168Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 520. 
169Id.  Heller got the idea for this plan at a legal seminar.  Id. The agreement was an 
unwritten agreement.  Id.  The process was in effect for a total of two and one-half years.  Id.   
170Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 520. 
171Id. 
172Appellants’ Warren Gen. Hosp.; Kevin Andrews; Elliott, Heller, Maas, Moro & Magill, 
Co., L.P.A.; and Robert L. Heller Merit Briefs; and Merit Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants 
Cheryl A. Biddle, Individually and as Executrix; and Gary Ball, at 2, Biddle v. Warren Gen. 
Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1999) (No. 96-5582).  Initially the hospital staff would separate 
the self-pay accounts so the law firm could come in and review them.  Id.  However, this 
would also not be enough to protect the parties from liability because the sorting did not 
provide consent from the patient.  Id.  Liability would only be avoided if the hospital staff was 
the initial caller to the patients and if the hospital obtained consent to send the registration 
forms to the law firm.  Id.  
173Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 520. 
174This was disputed by patient affidavits.  Id. at 520-21. 
175Id. at 520.  Ineligible patients’ forms were placed in boxes for storage and no further 
action was taken regarding these forms.  Id.  
176Id.  
177Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 520.  Neither Jacisin & Sutton stated where they worked.  Id.  
Specifically, Jacisin and Sutton stated, “[y]ou might be entitled to Social Security benefits that 
might help you pay your medical bill.”  Id.   
178Id. Heller claimed that he did not tell the patients that Elliott Heller would be 
representing them.  Id.  Instead, Heller said the patients retained Elliott Heller from their own 
free will.  Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 520.   
179Id.   
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patient testified that even though she never retained Elliott Heller, the firm’s name 
appeared in her letter from the Social Security Administration denying her 
benefits.180  Although approximately one hundred phone calls were made,181 Heller 
met with only five individuals, and only a couple of those patients were able to 
recover any financial assistance from the Social Security Administration through this 
process.182   
The agreement between Elliott Heller and Warren Hospital was first disclosed on 
WFMJ-TV in Youngstown.183  Sutton sent photocopies of patient registration forms 
to the television station in retaliation of learning the firm was terminating her 
employment.184  When the television investigation began, the relationship between 
Elliott Heller and Warren Hospital ended.185  This class action for breach of patient 
confidentiality and the inducement of the breach was filed less than a month later.186   
B.  Reasoning of the Ohio Supreme Court 
The analysis of Biddle includes similar explorations of law as the cases 
previously cited.  The court divided its treatment into five questions of law.187  First, 
was whether a hospital could be liable for the unauthorized disclosure of confidential 
information learned from the fiduciary relationship.188  In making the declaration, the 
court drew support from Ohio’s lower court decisions that held a physician liable for 
an unauthorized disclosure.189  The court wasted no time in acknowledging that a 
physician or hospital could be held liable for unauthorized disclosures of patient 
information.190   
                                                                
180Id. at 521.   
181It is unknown how many phone calls Sutton made because she did not testify.  See 
Biddle, 1998 WL 156997, at *1, *13. 
182Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 520.  See also Appellants Robert L. Heller and Elliott, Heller, 
Maas, Moro & Magill Co. L.P.A. Merit Brief at 4, Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 
518 (Ohio 1999) (No. 98-0952). 
183Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 521.   
184Id. 
185Id.  
186Id.  Other causes of action were also alleged, but the court stated the breach of 
confidentiality and inducement of the breach were the proper causes of action for unauthorized 
disclosures of confidential medical information.  Id. at 520.  These include invasion of 
privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, breach of implied contract, 
and improper solicitation.  Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 520. 
187Id. at 521. 
188Id. at 522. 
189Id.  See also Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 793; Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & 
Health Ctr., 529 N.E.2d 449 (Ohio 1988); Prince, 484 N.E.2d at 265; Levias, 500 N.E.2d at 
370; Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 226 N.E.2d at 760. 
190Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 522. 
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The second issue was whether breach of confidence in a physician-patient setting 
could be recognized as an independent tort.191  The court stated that there were no 
“serious” arguments against the recognition of breach of confidence as an 
independent tort.192  In an effort to avoid stretching legal theories and ignoring 
doctrinal limitations, the Ohio Supreme Court established that the unauthorized 
disclosure of medical information to a third party was an independent tort.193  
Support was also drawn from the nature of the physician-patient relationship itself 
due to its underlying purpose of confidence and its fiduciary character.194 
Third, the court had to determine if the hospital’s duty “to hold patient 
information confidential [was] absolute.”195  The court held that the duty was not 
because disclosures made pursuant to statutory mandate or common law duty have 
been permitted in lower Ohio courts and other state courts.196  In these cases, 
“disclosure [was] necessary to protect or further a countervailing interest which 
outweighs the patient’s interest in confidentiality.”197  However, no special 
circumstances permitting or requiring unauthorized disclosures existed that allowed 
Warren Hospital to release the patient registration forms to Elliott Heller.198  The 
agreement was merely an attempt to collect unpaid medical bills, and disclosures are 
not prescribed by Ohio law for this purpose.199 
The fourth issue was whether the hospital obtained clear patient consent of this 
type of disclosure.200  Warren Hospital’s patient consent form for release of medical 
                                                                
191Id. 
192Id.  
193Id. at 523.  In addressing other theories of liability, the court held, “many…courts have 
endeavored to fit a breach of confidence into a number of traditional or accepted legal 
theories.  Id.  In much the same way as trying to fit a round peg into a square hole…these 
theories prove ill-suited for the purpose, and their application contrived, as they are designed 
to protect diverse interests that only coincidentally overlap that of preserving patient 
confidentiality.”  Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 523. 
194Id.  The court cited the oft-quoted first state supreme court case exploring the issue of 
unauthorized medical disclosures, Smith v. Driscoll, when it stated, “[f]or so palpable a wrong, 
the law provides a remedy.”  Smith v. Driscoll, 162 P. 572, 572 (Wash. 1917), cited in Biddle, 
715 N.E.2d at 522.   
195Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 524. 
196Id.  See, e.g., Estates of Morgan, 673 N.E.2d at 1324; Hague, 181 A.2d at 349; Berry, 
331 P.2d at 817-18; Jones, 160 N.E. at 456; Simonsen, 177 N.W. at 832, cited collectively in 
Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 524.   
197Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 524. 
198Id.  Elliot Heller did have several arguments explaining that the information was never 
disclosed outside of the privilege due to the attorney-client privilege between Elliot Heller and 
Warren Hospital by showing how the privileged information stayed with in a “closed loop” 
and that the law firm was an alter ego of the hospital.  Id. at 524-27.  In addition, the firm 
argued that no extra information was released than would have been for the collection a debt.  
Id. at 527.  However, the court did not agree with any of the arguments.  See text of § IV(C), 
infra. 
199Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 524. 
200Id. at 527. 
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information stated that authorization was only granted to an “insurance company 
and/or third party payor.”201  The court stated that consent forms must be “fairly 
specific” as to who is authorized to have access to the patients’ confidential medical 
information.202  Since the registration forms were sent to the law firm despite the fact 
that the original consent did not permit the release to anyone except an insurance 
company or third party payor, the court held the hospital liable for unauthorized 
disclosure of the patient registration forms.203  The court urged medical professionals, 
who wished to utilize this type of procedure, to obtain specific written consent for 
each disclosure.204 
Finally, the court recognized the tort of a third party inducement of an 
unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical information.205  The court held that 
the intent was to protect the patient’s interest in obtaining medical care and limit 
disclosure to those who have a “legitimate interest in the patient’s health.”206  In 
addition, the court stated that each patient should be the controller of the patient’s 
interests, and it was the patient’s right to determine who is to have access to 
confidential medical information.207  After reiterating the elements for the 
inducement of an unauthorized disclosure as previously held in other cases, the court 
found that reasonable minds could conclude that the hospital breached its duty of 
confidentiality and the law firm induced the breach.208   
C.  Failed Arguments 
The Ohio Supreme Court entertained a number of arguments by the hospital and 
law firm, which it determined to be inadequate for a variety of reasons.  The first was 
                                                                
201Id.  It is implied that a general authorization does not provide enough protection for 
patients’ rights to confidentiality.  Id.   
202Id.  The insinuation is that if the hospital had continued the pre-screening process, 
explicit consent could be obtained by the patient giving authorization to the hospital to send 
the records to the law firm.  Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 527.  See discussion in § IV(D), infra.   
203Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 528. 
204Id. at 527-28.  As shown by the harsh result in Biddle, it is also in the discloser’s best 
interest to obtain specific consent in order to avoid liability.  Id. at 529. 
205Id. at 528.  The court stated that other forms of liability are not adequate due to the 
various limitations previously examined.  Id. at 529.  However, the other theories may be 
explored when the facts of the case fall outside the breach of confidence tort.  Biddle, 715 
N.E.2d at 529.  In conclusion, the court stated, “it is the very awkwardness of the traditional 
causes of action that justifies the recognition of the tort for breach of confidence in the first 
place.”  Id.   
206Id.  The court still acknowledged that certain situations exist that justify disclosure.  Id.   
207Id. 
208Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 528. The elements include “(1) the defendant knew or reasonably 
should have known of the existence of the physician-patient relationship; (2) the defendant 
intended to induce the physician to disclose information about the patient or the defendant 
reasonably should have anticipated that his actions would induce the physician to disclose 
such information; and (3) the defendant did not reasonably believe that the physician could 
disclose that information to the defendant without violating the duty of confidentiality that the 
physician owed the patient.”  Id. 
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an extension of the qualified privilege doctrine, which encourages the uninhibited 
flow of information from a client to an attorney.209  The defendants argued that since 
the attorney was also subject to a duty of confidentiality, the disclosure from Warren 
Hospital to Elliott Heller was privileged – a “closed loop in which confidential or 
privileged information goes from the patient to the hospital and then from the 
hospital to its lawyers.”210  In support of this argument, the appellants’ cited Neal v. 
Corning Glass Works Corp.,211 which held that a patient’s confidential medical 
information could be disclosed to another physician because the duty to the patient is 
the same for both physicians.  However, the court rejected this argument because 
“[t]he main thrust of these arguments is to focus our attention on the nature of the 
relationship between attorney and client, rather than between physician and 
patient.”212  The court distinguished Neal in its ruling because, unlike a physician that 
owes a duty of confidentiality to the patient, the law firm instead owes a duty of 
confidentiality to its client, the hospital, and no duty was directly owed to the 
patient.213   
Moreover, the court reasoned that each defendant was bound by a completely 
different set of ethical regulations,214 and the law firm’s duty to its client does not 
stem or depend on a confidential relationship that exists between its client and a 
stranger.215  In Biddle, the client of the law firm is the hospital, and the client of the 
hospital is the patient.216  Although this may appear to be a continual chain of 
confidence, the duties of an attorney towards his or her client are different from that 
of a doctor towards his or her patient. 217  The two relationships independently do not 
create an attorney-client relationship between the law firm and the hospital 
patients.218  Because Elliott Heller’s duty was to Warren Hospital, and not to any of 
                                                                
209Id. at 524-25. 
210Id. at 525. 
211Id. at 524-25, citing Neal, 745 F. Supp. at 1294 (holding physician not held liable for 
revealing patient’s positive drug test).   
212Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 525.  The court foresaw even extreme examples avoiding 
liability, such as “the individual medical practitioner who releases the bulk of his or her office 
files without authorization so that a lawyer can search through them for potential workers’ 
compensation or personal injury claimants.  Id.   
213Id. at 525-26. 
214Id. at 522.  An extension of the court’s reasoning was that the law firm is bound by the 
OHIO CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 and EC 4-1, which require an attorney to 
hold the confidences and secrets of clients confidential.  Id. at 525-26.  The court concluded 
that the law firm’s duty under DR 4-101 is to keep the confidences and secrets of its client, the 
hospital, but not the patients of the hospital; therefore, the privilege of the doctor in Neal is 
distinguishable.  Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 525-26. 
215Id. at 526. 
216Id. at 520.   
217Id. 
218Id. 
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the hospital’s patients, no “closed loop” allowed the disclosure to remain 
privileged.219   
A second argument addressed by the court was that the law firm was merely an 
“alter ego” of the hospital because the law firm qualified as a third party through its 
status as the hospital’s agent, and it could not be held to induce a breach of 
confidentiality.220  The court held that the authorities, on which the appellants’ relied 
for this theory did not apply to the facts at hand.221  First, the defendants relied on 
Ohio Revised Code § 2317.021, which provides the definition of “client” within the 
attorney-client relationship as being a person who communicates directly or through 
an agent with an attorney. 222  The court felt that the attorney was the party who 
communicated with the agent, and could not fulfill both the attorney and agent roles 
simultaneously.223  In addition, the court thought the Uniform Health-Care 
Information Act did not carry much weight for the “alter ego” theory because it was 
not adopted in Ohio or in a majority of other states.224  Even if the “alter ego” theory 
were applicable, it would not give free license to a principal to disclose confidential 
information to the agent.225  Rather than give great deference to the alter-ego concept, 
the court provided a strict interpretation of the Code in order to protect the rights of 
patients.226 
Another argument, which was only addressed in passing, was that the hospital 
was merely taking action in good faith by collecting a bill that would otherwise have 
been a write-off.227  While the court acknowledged that the law is not settled in Ohio, 
it speculated that the only information that the hospital needed to disclose was 
information that was clearly necessary to collect the debt.228  This argument was 
weakened when a witness testified that if unpaid bills were the only matter at hand, 
the only disclosures that would be required are the amount of the bill owed, any 
                                                                
219Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 525. 
220Id. at 525-26. 
221Id. at 526.  The appellants’ relied on OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.021 (West 1963) 
and the Uniform Health-Care Information Act.  Id. 
222Id. at 526. 
223Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 526.  The court stated, “a refusal to recognize a privilege in this 
case will not sound the death knell of the attorney-client relationship.  Id.  By withholding a 
privilege in this case, we do no more than recognize that there are some circumstances under 
which a hospital can be held liable for the unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical 
information to an attorney.”  Id. 
224Id. 
225Id.  
226Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 526.  The court did not address the breach of the legal secretary 
of law firm when the legal secretary disclosed the registration forms to the television station.  
Id. at 521.  This may be because it felt public policy would excuse her actions because she was 
disclosing a wrong done to many people.  Additionally, whether the hospital has a claim 
against the law firm for contribution of its breach is also not discussed. 
227Id. at 527 n.1. 
228Id. (quoting Johnston, Breach of Medical Confidence in Ohio, 19 AKRON L. REV. 373, 
391 (1986)). 
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payment history, and any insurance information.229  The medical conditions of each 
patient released in Biddle were more than was required to collect a bill and, as a 
result, the court found that it was not crucial to treat this issue at that time.230  
Because the issue was that confidential information not be disclosed, the court 
thought that the fact that the law firm was trying to help patients with their medical 
bills in good faith did not matter.231  In addition, the claim that the law firm acted in 
good faith is placed in doubt because one of the law firm’s legal assistants knew 
enough about the potential risk of liability that she copied numerous pages of the 
patient registrations and sent them to the television station in order to retaliate 
against her soon-to-be former employer.232  Therefore, creative lawyering through 
the use of the “closed loop” theory, the “alter ego” theory, and the good faith 
collection of an unpaid bill argument was not enough to distract the attention of the 
Ohio Supreme Court from its main concern – protecting patients from unauthorized 
disclosures of confidential medical information. 
V.  TREATMENT OF LAW POST-BIDDLE v. WARREN GENERAL HOSPITAL 
Since Biddle’s recent decision, courts have begun to treat the analysis of the case 
in a positive manner; Thompson v. Eiler demonstrates looser treatment.233  In 
Thompson, a medical facility released records regarding carpal tunnel syndrome, 
which also documented treatment for depression in order to process a workers’ 
compensation claim.234  In the course of her claim, the patient signed two separate 
release forms.235  The First District Court of Appeals of Ohio cited Biddle when it 
                                                                
229Id. 
230Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 527 n.1.  The court stated, “[p]laced in its proper perspective, 
such a privilege would also protect the individual medical practitioner who releases the bulk of 
his or her office files without authorization so that a lawyer can search through them for 
potential worker’s compensation or personal injury claimants.”  Id.  The court stated, “[t]he 
hospital’s actions may, only in the broadest possible sense, be characterized as a collection 
effort,” and but it is certainly not the kind of collection effort contemplated by those 
authorities who would grant a privilege to collect an overdue debt.”  Id. 
231Id. at 528.  This is also supported by the Court’s statement that the particular need for 
the information did not matter.  Id.  The Court stated, “the inducer’s need for the information 
is irrelevant unless it is to advance or protect some interest giving rise to a privilege.” Biddle, 
715 N.E.2d at 528.  This holding is further supported by the federal Northern District of Ohio 
court’s previous decision in Hammonds that no malicious motive was needed in order to be 
liable for an unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical information.  Hammonds, 243 F. 
Supp. at 798. 
232Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 521. 
233Thompson v. Eiler, No. C-990634, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2895 (Ohio Ct. App. June 
30, 2000); Fair v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., No. 17942, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 56 (Ohio Ct. 
App. January 14, 2000). 
234Thompson, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2895, at *4.   
235Id., at *4-5.  Specifically, the first form stated “READ CAREFULLY BEFORE 
SIGNING *** By signing this application I expressly waive all provisions of law which 
forbid any person, persons, or medical facility who heretofore did or who hereafter may 
medically attend, treat, or examine me or who may have information of any kind which may 
be used to render a decision in my claim, from disclosing such knowledge or information to 
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recognized that an independent tort exists for the unauthorized disclosure of 
confidential medical information, but did not hold the medical facility liable for the 
disclosure.236  Because the patient had signed two appropriate consent forms and 
filed a claim for workers’ compensation, the court held that the patient authorized the 
release of the records that regarded her carpal tunnel syndrome.237  Moreover, the 
facility was not liable for the disclosure of the depression records because a statute 
required the Bureau of Worker’s Compensation to investigate and determine which 
statements were appropriate for each claim.238  The court noted that it was the 
claimant’s decision to run the risk of a potential disclosure by participating in the 
state’s insurance fund.239  Thus, although the court based its ruling on the Biddle 
decision, it applies a looser standard when filing a worker’s compensation claim.   
Biddle was also cited as “new law” concerning unauthorized disclosures of 
medical information in Fair v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, where the plaintiff sued 
a Medical Center for failing to protect her when another psychiatric patient attacked 
her in a community area.240  The patient argued that the alleged attacker’s 
confidential medical records should be admitted at trial in order to establish that a 
special relationship existed between the attacker and the medical center and to 
determine that the medical center had breached a duty to control the attacker.241  The 
court acknowledged Biddle’s “appropriate circumstance” exception where the rights 
of an injured party supercede those of a patient and create a conditional or qualified 
privilege to disclose.242  Disclosure was found to be the appropriate action because 
the medical center had a duty to reasonably protect the plaintiff from assault or 
battery by third persons, even if it was from another patient.243 
                                                          
the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, its agents or the Industrial Commission.”  Id.  In full, 
the second note stated, “To Whom It May Concern: I agree to release my physician’s and or 
hospital records to Michelman, Inc. for the purpose of my Worker’s Comp evaluation.  Please 
accept this fax as authorization for you to release only the records regarding my Carpal Tunnel 
Syndrome to Michelman, Inc. and its representatives.”  Id. 
236Id. at *1.   
237Thompson, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2895, at *13.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 
permits the filing of a workers’ compensation claim to constitute a compulsory waiver of the 
physician-patient privilege.  Id. at *12. 
238Id. at *14-15. 
239Id. at *16. 
240Fair, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 56, at *11.  Interestingly, the court did not rely on Estates 
of Morgan, 673 N.E.2d at 1311, in which a statute providing that no person is liable for any 
harm that comes as a result of failing to disclose any confidential information about mental 
health does not preclude a finding that a the psychotherapist has a special duty to take 
affirmative steps to control a patient’s conduct.   
241Id. at *7. 
242Id. at *7, *9 (overruling Johnston v. Miami Valley Hosp., 572 N.E.2d 169 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1989)), which refused to create an exception to the physician-patient privilege to prove 
the existence of a special relationship between a hospital and patient who caused injury to 
another patient). 
243Id. at *10. 
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Whether these cases, which take a much more lenient approach to patients right 
than Biddle, are representative of a trend is yet to be seen.  But it is apparent from 
these two cases, in which, despite the strict nature of Biddle, it is still possible to 
disclose pursuant to a statutory mandate or common law exception, including those 
which are not specified in the Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion.   
VI.  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
A.  Pre-screening 
The result in Biddle could have been avoided by minimal action on the part of the 
hospital and the law firm.  One possibility is that the hospital could have continued 
its procedure of obtaining consent by using the hospital staff to call the patients that 
were potentially eligible for Supplemental Security Income.  The process of 
informing the patients of the potential to have a portion of their medical bills paid 
and providing the patients with the phone number of the law firm to receive more 
information would give the law firm an opportunity to receive consent from the 
patients directly. 
B.  Redaction 
In a situation where only a part of a document contains confidential information, 
another possible solution is to redact those areas that are confidential.  This is 
applicable to the physician-patient privilege and the attorney-client privilege, but the 
act of redaction must be completed by the party who enjoys the privilege in order to 
prevent the privileged information from being disclosed.  Blocking out confidential 
information and still preserving the document remains in the spirit of only disclosing 
what is absolutely necessary in order to obtain payment for a bill or to accomplish 
another goal. 
C.  Educate Other Fiduciaries  
Another possible solution is to invoke seminars, performed by attorneys in order 
to educate medical professionals about Biddle, its defenses, and the potential liability 
that may arise from various disclosures.  The attorneys can provide case studies, or 
other examples, in an attempt to explain what a proper procedure is for disclosing 
confidential information.  In essence, it is practicing preventative medicine.  These 
seminars may be particularly important in states that do not follow the traditional 
analyses regarding disclosure liability. 
D.  Staff Training 
Often liability is incurred because an office staff person at a medical facility 
breaks protocol or mistakenly sends extra confidential information than what is 
actually authorized.  Creating strict in-house procedures for staff members should 
alleviate the temptation for any staff members to disclose information at the request 
of the public.  Requiring permission in order to send out patient information may 
also avoid any close-calls in which a staff member might use mistaken judgment.  
Also, training sessions, especially for beginners, that explain disclosure procedures 
and the liability that can be incurred personally and on behalf of the facility may help 
to prevent any unknowing disclosures. 
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E.  Consent/ Waiver  
Finally, the best way to avoid liability is to receive explicit, written consent from 
the patient.  Perhaps the result of Biddle will be the use of patient waivers that are of 
the length and detail of a car lease in order to ensure explicit consent.  The specific 
fact that a consent form was signed in Biddle occurs less frequently in other 
situations because a consent form does not always exist.  However, the impact of 
Biddle’s holding is clearly important because the holding may also be applied to 
cases where no consent form is involved.   
What Warren Hospital and Elliott Heller should have done was to create a waiver 
of liability that specifically named the law firm as a party authorized to receive 
confidential medical information that was signed by each patient.  The waiver may 
provide insulation from liability, as it does for insurance companies and others today.  
Guidance in drafting waiver forms can be found in other situations where waiver 
forms have been utilized, and the legislature has been highly specific regarding what 
information is mandatory in each waiver.244  The disclosure and inducing of the 
disclosure can occur either if no consent form exists, or if the form is inadequate.  
Having key phrases in larger and bolded font can increase the effectiveness of a 
consent form or waiver.  The important message to convey to the patient is that by 
signing, patients are potentially waiving liability for disclosures or at least granting 
authorization to confidential medical information for the specific purpose noted.  The 
more clearly a consent form portrays this message, the more likely the consent form 
will be upheld. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Biddle v. Warren General Hospital is the Ohio Supreme Court’s warning for 
medical professionals and entities, as well as the third parties who relate with them, 
to take notice of the strict analysis used for the unauthorized disclosure of 
confidential medical information.  It is a call to all those in the medical profession to 
quickly examine and possibly alter their procedures for collection or other 
disclosures.  A major concern of those opposed to the holding of Biddle is that the 
attorney-client privilege is headed for impending doom.  However, the Ohio 
Supreme Court reassured that this is not the case by stating that the “death knell” of 
the attorney-client relationship will not be sounded by the court’s holding.245  The 
court stated, “by withholding a privilege in this case, we do no more than recognize 
that there are some circumstances under which a hospital can be held liable for the 
                                                                
244For example, in order to release records from a drug treatment program, the consent 
form must “(1) [s]pecifically identif[y] the person, official, or entity to whom the information 
is to be provided; (2) [d]escribe[] with reasonable specificity the record, records, or 
information to be disclosed; and (3) [d]escribe[] with reasonable specificity the purposes of 
the disclosure and the intended use of the disclosed information.”  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3793.13(B) (West 1999).  Also, in order to obtain informed consent from a patient, the 
consent is required to “set[] forth in general terms the nature and purpose of the procedure or 
procedures, and what the procedures are expected to accomplish, together with the reasonably 
known risks, and, except in emergency situations, set[] forth the names of the physicians who 
shall perform the intended surgical procedures” in addition to acknowledging that the 
disclosure has been made and any questions answered.  § 2317.54(A) & (B). 
245Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 526. 
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unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical information to an attorney.”246  
Although a cry for help is being heard for those who fear that Biddle means endless 
liability for the medical profession, the cases since Biddle’s decision have not made 
this apparent.  Therefore, let the overall lesson be learned - if adequate protection of 
patient confidentiality is not maintained, no court will support the disclosure unless 
the situation falls under one of the statutory or common law exceptions previously 
mentioned.247  Fiduciaries may find themselves facing a holding similar to that of 
Biddle: “We can find no interest, public or private, that would justify the recognition 
of a privilege under these circumstances.”248 
                                                                
246Id.  
247The exceptions include when danger to a patient, a patient’s spouse, or other person 
exists; when the physical condition of the patient is an element of the claim; if the patient has a 
highly contagious or infectious disease; or in a general duty to warn case; if the physician is 
testifying during a judicial proceeding; if the duty is not recognized within that jurisdiction; in 
First Amendment and Public Right to Know situations; if the disclosure is required for a 
medical peer review process; when a medical malpractice claim is brought by the patient 
against the physician; if a crime or a fraud is disclosed; or if authorized by a court order, 
although a controversy exists as to whether this is permitted ex parte; disclosure to a potential 
victim or their family that the victim’s life may be in danger because the patient wanted to kill 
him or her.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.421, 2317.02, 2921.22, 3701.243, and 5122.31 
(West 1999). 
248Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 527. 
